Defaming by Suggestion: Searching for Search Engine Liability in the Autocomplete Era by Cheung, ASY
Title Defaming by Suggestion: Searching for Search Engine Liabilityin the Autocomplete Era
Author(s) Cheung, ASY
Citation
Defaming by Suggestion: Searching for Search Engine Liability
in the Autocomplete Era. In Comparative Perspectives on the
Fundamentals of Freedom of Expression, p. Forthcoming . , 2015
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/210613
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2611074 
 1 







Whilst different jurisdictions have yet to reach consensus on search engines’ 
liability for defamation,
1
 Internet giant Google is confronting judges and academics 
with another challenge: the basis of liability for defamation arising from its 
Autocomplete function. With Autocomplete, Google no longer merely presents us 
with snippets, excerpts of relevant webpages originating from third-party websites, 
after we type in our search queries. Rather, it suggests associated search words and 
terms to us before we even complete typing the words as originally planned, and 
before we even press ‘Enter’. By constantly altering the query based on each 
additional keystroke in the search bar, Autocomplete changes the way search queries 
are generated.
2
 In other words, Google anticipates, predicts or even feeds us ideas, 
and may redirect our interests in the process of our search attempts. For instance, if 
one searches for Bettina Wulff, the wife of former German President Christian Wulff, 
terms such as ‘escort’ and ‘prostitute’ are automatically paired up with her name in 
the Google search box. One can only imagine the surprise of the unsuspecting reader 
who had no idea of the rumour that Wulff had once been an escort, let alone the 
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 2 
distress of Wulff herself.
3
 Although most jurisdictions are reluctant to hold search 
engines liable for defamation, judges seem to hold different views when it comes to 
such liability in the case of Autocomplete.
4
  
In 2014, for example, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance held that a claimant 
whose name was often paired with ‘triad member’ in Autocomplete had a good 
arguable case of defamation to proceed with and dismissed a claim of summary 
dismissal application made by Google in Dr Yeung Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc 
(hereinafter referred to as Yeung v Google).
5
 Earlier, in 2013, the Federal Court of 
Germany held Google to be liable for violating a plaintiff’s personality rights and 
reputation for associating his name with ‘fraud’ and ‘Scientology’ in an Autocomplete 
search (this case is hereinafter referred to as RS v Google).
6
 Are these decisions 
justified?  
Most of us are likely to be hesitant in holding Google liable for defamation based 
on its search engine results. After all, nearly all of us are indebted to search engines, 
and our lives would be considerably more difficult without them. Search engines are 
powerful intermediaries that enable Internet users to identify and locate information 
from the gigantic volume of data that has flooded cyberspace. The World Wide Web 
                                                        
3
 Bettina Wulff sued Google for defamation in 2012 for linking her name with ‘escort’ and ‘prostitute’, 
and the lawsuit was settled in 2012. Der Spiegel, ‘Autocomplete-Funktion: Bettina Wulff und Google 
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6
 RS v Google is the author’s formulation for easy reference. The official citation of the judgment is 
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“Autocomplete” Function,’ (2013) 8(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 797. 
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is made up of up 60 trillion individual pages,
7
 with over three billion Internet users, 
every one of whom is a potential contributor
8
 In the face of such daunting amounts of 
information, search engines play an indispensable role in identifying the best and 
most useful information for us. Yet, when search engines not only deliver potentially 
defamatory search results to us upon request, but actually suggest defamatory ideas to 
us, a different framework of legal analysis may be called for.  
The legal debate over the liability arising from the Autocomplete function 
captures the empowering and forbidding power of search engines. In examining the 
legal reasoning behind the Hong Kong case of Yeung v Google and German case of 
RS v Google, and comparing the two, this chapter argues that the orthodox approach 
to fixing responsibility for defamation, based either on the established English 
common law notion of publisher or innocent disseminator or the existing categories of 
passive host, conduit and caching in the relevant European Union Directive, is far 
from adequate to address the challenges brought about by search engines and their 
Autocomplete function.
9
 Whilst orthodox common law is strict in imposing liability 
in the case of a person’s participation in publication, and is fixated on identifying his 
or her state of knowledge and extent of control in the defamation action, the European 
Union approach is preoccupied with the over-simplified binary of seeing an 
intermediary as either an active or passive entity. The legal challenge posed by search 
engines, however, stems from the fact that they run on artificial intelligence (AI).
10
 
                                                        
7
 Google, How Search Works <http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory/> 
accessed 16 April 2015. 
8
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9
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
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10
 Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the study of the programming and performance of computers 
used both for problem-solving across a wide range of intellectual, engineering and operational tasks 
and as a tool in psychology for modelling mental abilities. It is concerned with the building of 
computer programmes that perform tasks requiring intelligence when done by humans, including game 
 4 
Autocomplete predictions are automatically generated by an algorithm effectively 
using more than 200 signals to extrapolate information from the Internet, and then 
generating likely predictions from each variant of a word.
11
 The process takes place 
automatically, although the design of the algorithm is frequently updated and 
modified by engineers. In the entire process, Google retains control in generating its 
search results.
12
 The legal issue should be redirected towards examining the possible 
role played by the algorithm creators in the content or result generated. Thus, this 
chapter argues that, in its Autocomplete function, Google indeed plays a unique role 
in contributing to defamatory content. Although the Hong Kong Court has not 
delivered any definitive answer on the role and liability of Google Inc., in a summary 
application, the German Court has rightly recognised the novel legal challenge that 
search engine prediction technology presents and treated search engines as a special 
intermediary processor. As explained earlier, an Autocomplete suggestion responds to 
a search query in a unique way with the mere input of each additional stroke and 
without the user completing his or her query. In this ‘search-in-progress’,13 Google is 
neither entirely active nor entirely passive, but rather interactive. Thus, imposing 
                                                                                                                                                              
playing, automated reasoning, machine learning, natural-language understanding, planning, speech 
understanding and theorem proving. John Daintith and Edmund Wright, ‘Artificial Intelligence’ in A 
Dictionary of Computing (6 ed. OUP 2008) 
< http://www.oxfordreference.com.eproxy1.lib.hku.hk/view/10.1093/acref/9780199234004.00.0001/ac
ref-9780199234004-e-204?rskey=bN7dW6&result=9> accessed 11 May 2015. 
11
 Magazine Monitor, ‘Who, What, Why: How Does Google’s Autocomplete Censor Predictions?’ 
(BBC, 5 February 2015) < http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-31131920  > accessed 
14 May 2015. 
12
 The ways that Google can manipulate search results can be seen in a report by the US Federal Trade 
Commission investigation. Federal Trade Commission, Google Agrees to Change Its Business 
Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, 
Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (3 January 2013) < https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc> accessed 18 April 2015. For 
discussion of litigation challenging Google’s practices in the US, Tansy Woan, ‘Searching for an 
Answer: Can Google Legally Manipulate Search Engine Results?’ (2013) 16 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 294. 
13
 Smith argues that a distinction should be drawn between a search-in-progress and a completed search. 
Google materially contributes in the former but not in the latter. Michael L. Smith, ‘Search Engine 
Liability for Autocomplete Defamation: Combating the Power of Suggestion,’ University of Illinois 
Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 313, 329 (2013). 
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liability on Google in a defamation action based on its Autocomplete function is 
justified in a notice-and-takedown regime when a substantive complaint has been 
made. 
 
Search Engine and Autocomplete as Publisher: Yeung v Google 
 
In Yeung v Google, the plaintiff sued Google Inc. for providing defamatory predictive 
suggestions through its search engine’s Autocomplete and Related Searches 
features.
14
 Whenever users typed Yeung’s name (Albert Yeung Sau Shing) into 
Google in English or Chinese, Google Autocomplete instantaneously and 
automatically generated a list of search suggestions in a drop-down menu before they 
clicked on the search button, some of which linked Yeung to the names of specific 
triad gangs and serious criminal offences. Likewise, when users typed his name into 
Google’s search box, characters or words related to triad societies were generated as 
outcome/results under a list of Related Searches.
15
 The plaintiff is a well-known 
businessman in Hong Kong and the founder of a company that engages in various 
business sectors, including entertainment and films, and manages a number of Hong 
Kong celebrities. Yeung was understandably upset by the Google search results and 
suggestions, and accordingly made a defamation claim against Google Inc. and sought 
an injunction to restrain it from publishing and/or participating in the publication of 
alleged libellous material.
16
 More specifically, he demanded that Google remove or 
prevent defamatory words from appearing or reappearing in any current or future 
                                                        
14
 HCA 1383/2012 [5]. 
15
 ibid [4b]. Google Inc. stopped running the Related Searches feature in 2013. Barry Schwartz, 
‘Google Pulls Related Searches Filter Due To Lack Of Usage’ (2013)  
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 As Google Inc. is a US-based company, the plaintiff had to apply 
for leave to serve the writ of summons out of jurisdiction in the US.
18
 It was therefore 
necessary for Yeung to demonstrate that he had a good arguable case involving a 
substantive question of fact or law to be tried on the merits of his claim.
19
  
Although Justice Marlene Ng of the Hong Kong High Court delivered only a 
summary judgment, her reasoning was detailed (filling 100 pages) and centred largely 
on whether Google Inc. should be considered the publisher of the suggestions or 
predictions that appear in Autocomplete and Related Searches.
20
 The defence 
counsel’s major argument was that Google Inc. is not a publisher, as no human input 
or operation is required in the search process, but is rather a mere passive medium of 
communication.
21
 However, Justice Ng was not convinced, and subsequently ruled 
that there was a good arguable case for considering Google Inc. as a publisher. 
 
Search Engine Liability 
In defamation cases under common law, publication takes place when a 
defendant communicates a defamatory statement to a third party, and liability in 
defamation arises from participation in the publication of defamatory material.
22
 
Under this strict publication rule, a person would be held liable for publishing a libel 
‘if by an act of any description, he could be said to have intentionally assisted in the 
process of conveying the words bearing the defamatory meaning to a third party, 
                                                        
17
 ibid [6]. 
18
 Under Order 11 rule1(1)(f) of Rules of High Court, ibid [11]. 
19
 ibid [35]. 
20
 Other issues before the Court included whether there was evidence of publication of the defamatory 
statement to a genuine third party. Justice Ng concluded that publication to any third party would be 
established regardless of whether that publication was by the procurement of the plaintiff, ibid [20], [41] 
and [48]. 
21
 ibid [51]. 
22
 Alastair Mullis and Richard Parkes (ed), Gatley on Libel and Slander (12 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
Thomson Reuters 2013), para 6.23. 
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regardless of whether he knew that the article in question contained those words’.23 
Prima facie, the author, editor, publisher, printer, distributor or vendor of a newspaper 
is liable for the material therein.
24
        
  Having said that, common law allows the defence of innocent dissemination 
for an individual who is not the first or main publisher of a libellous work but who ‘in 
the ordinary course of business plays a subordinate role in the process of 
disseminating the impugned article’.25 Well known examples of those who can make 
such a defence are the proprietors of libraries (Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library 
Limited)
26
 and newsvendors (Emmens v Pottle).
27
 To rely on this defence and to be 
seen as a secondary publisher or innocent disseminator, the defendant must show (1) 
that he or she was unaware or innocent of any knowledge of the libel contained in the 
work disseminated by him or her; (2) that there was nothing in the work or the 
circumstances under which it came to or was disseminated by him or her that should 
have led him or her to suppose that it contained a libel; and (3) that such want of 
knowledge was not due to any negligence on his or her part.
28
 The onus of proof is on 
the defendant.
29
 In comparison, a primary publisher is one who knows about or can 
easily acquire knowledge of the content of the article in question and has a realistic 
ability to control its publication.
30
 The Hong Kong Court refers to these two criteria as 
the ‘knowledge criterion’ and the ‘control criterion’.31 The former refers to the fact 
that a publisher must know or be taken to know ‘the gist or substantive content of 
what is being published’, although there may be no realisation that the content is 
                                                        
23
 Yeung v Google (n 14) [57], quoting Oriental Press Group Ltd. v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd. 
(hereinafter referred as Fevaworks) [2013] HKCFA 47 [19]. 
24
 Mullis and Parkes (n 22). 
25
 Yeung v Google (n 14) [59]. 
26
 [1900] 2 QB 170.  
27
 (1886) 16 QBD 354. 
28
 The ratio was established in the Vizetelly judgment, referred to in Fevaworks (n 23) [27]. 
29
 Fevaworks (n 23). 
30




actually defamatory in law.
32
 The latter points to the publisher’s realistic ability and 
opportunity to prevent and control the publication of defamatory content.
33
 The 
liability of the primary publisher is strict, with no defence available. 
Armed with the common law principle of strict publication liability in Yeung v 
Google, Justice Ng concluded that Google Inc. is definitely a publisher. Applying the 
law to the given facts, it was obvious to Justice Ng that Google Inc. is in the business 
of disseminating information and had, in this case, participated in the publication and 
dissemination of the alleged defamatory statement.
34
 The company has created and 
operates automated systems that generate materials in a manner it intends, thereby 
providing a platform for dissemination, encouragement, facilitation or active 
participation in publication. If Google Inc. is indeed the publisher of its Autocomplete 
and Related Searches results, the next legal question is whether the company should 
be considered the primary or secondary publisher. It is this separate issue that proves 
precisely the limitation of common law in the face of contemporary technological 
challenges. 
 
‘The’ Common Law 
What Justice Ng did in the aforementioned case is apply the strict publication 
rule under an orthodox understanding of common law to an Internet service 
provider’s (ISP) liability. This approach was first propounded in Oriental Press 
Group Ltd v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Fevaworks) by the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.
35
 The highest court in Hong Kong ruled that a 
provider of an online discussion forum is a secondary publisher and must bear legal 
                                                        
32
 Yeung v Google (n 14) [74]. 
33




 Fevaworks, (n 23). 
 9 
liability for defamatory remarks posted by third parties, with its responsibilities being 
imposed from the outset, but that it does have recourse to the defence of innocent 
dissemination.
36
 The actual effect of the judgment is that online discussion forum 
providers now have to remove any alleged defamatory remarks within a reasonable 
timeframe upon receiving notification from the complainant.
37
 The judgment has been 
cited as a faithful application of orthodox common law principles of publication.
38
 
Yet, it should be noted that Hong Kong’s position constitutes a departure from a 
leading case in the area of search engine and Internet intermediary liability in England. 
The English case that is of direct relevance to the present debate is 
Metropolitan Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp. (hereinafter referred to as 
Metropolitan Schools Ltd), the judgment on which was delivered by the English High 
Court in 2009.
39
 The claimant, Metropolitan Schools Ltd, was a provider of adult 
distance learning courses on the development and design of computer games. The first 
defendant, Designtechnica Corp., hosted web forums that include threads which the 
claimant said defamed it by accusing it of running a fraudulent practice. Google UK 
Ltd was another defendant because it published or caused to be published in its search 
engine a ‘snippet’ of information linking Metropolitan Schools to the word ‘scam’.40 
The claimant demanded removal of the defamatory statements from the web forums 
and the Google search engine. The fundamental issue before the English High Court 
was whether Google as a search engine should be held liable for publication under 
common law.  
                                                        
36
 Fevaworks [2013] HKCFA 47, [12], [103]. 
37
 I have argued that although the legal outcome of the Fevaworks case is justified, the legal reasoning 
is far from satisfactory. Anne SY Cheung, ‘Liability of Internet Host Providers in Defamation Actions: 
From Gatekeepers to Identifiers’ in Andras Koltay (ed), Media Freedom and Regulation in the New 
Media World (Wolters Kluwer Ltd 2014). 
38
 Mullis and Parkes (n 22), para 6.29. 
39
 [2009] EWHC 1765. 
40
 ibid [18]. 
 10 
Justice David Eady ruled that Google was not a publisher at all. Instead of 
asking whether there had been any participation in publication by Google, as 
generally seen in orthodox common law analysis, Justice Eady considered that the 
starting point should be examination of the ‘mental element’, that is, the defendant’s 
degree of awareness or at least assumption of general responsibility.
41
 It was clear to 
him that Google does not have any mental capacity or the required knowledge 
because there is neither human input nor intervention when a search is performed 
automatically in accordance with a computer programme.
42
 Search results are 
generated, he said, by web-crawling robots designed by Google, which then report 
text matches in response to a search term.
43
 Furthermore, in the case in question, 
Google could not have effectively prevented the defamatory snippet from appearing 
in response to a user’s request.44  
Justice Eady’s position in Metropolitan Schools Ltd was consistent with his earlier 
ruling in Bunt v Tilley
45
 in which he did not treat ISPs as publishers of defamatory 
statements in an online discussion forum. Although one may criticise Justice Eady’s 
ruling as an unwarranted departure from orthodox common law principles on 
publication and defamation,
46
 his interpretation of common law is a response to the 
technological reality of the Internet age. In fact, he examined the rationale behind 
common law precedents, and further developed the law in light of contemporary 
challenges and the legislative developments in other European countries. First, he 
referred to Emmens v Pottle, a case dating back to 1885 that established the defence 
                                                        
41
 ibid [49]. 
42
 ibid [50] 
43
 ibid [53]. 
44
 ibid [51]. 
45
 [2006] EWHC 407. 
46
 Mullis and Parkes (n 22) para. 6.27. 
 11 
of innocent dissemination for newsvendors.
47
 Justice Eady examined the rationale 
behind the distinction between a publisher and a disseminator. He then commented 
that analogies are not always helpful, particularly when the law has to be applied to 
new and unfamiliar concepts.
48
 It was plain to him that, as a search engine is not the 
author of a defamatory statement, and is thus hardly comparable to a printer or 
newspaper proprietor, it cannot be considered a primary publisher.
49
 Equally, it is not 
a library. At best, in Justice Eady’s view, it can be compared to a compiler of a 
conventional library catalogue, where conscious effort is involved.
50
 However, none 
of these analogies is entirely suited to the modern search engine. Thus, Justice Eady 
concluded that a search engine does not fit exactly into the category of disseminator. 
To a certain extent, it is even more innocent than a disseminator in passing on a 
defamatory statement. In 2009, there were approximately 39 billion web pages and 
1.59 billion Internet users.
51
 At the time, Google compiled an index of pages from the 
web, and its Googlebot’s automated and pre-programmed algorithmic search 
processes then extracted information from that index and found matching webpages to 
return results that contained or were relevant to the search terms.
52
 Justice Eady 




Second, Justice Eady perused the positions of various national courts on rulings 
concerning Google’s role in defamation as a search engine under European Union 
                                                        
47
 (1885) 16 QBD 354, discussed [2009] EWHC 1765 [49], referred to in n 27 earlier. 
48
 [2009] EWHC 1765 [52]. 
49




 ibid [7]. 
52
 For an understanding of how search engine technology works in Google’s PageRank, Autocomplete 
and search feature, Ghatnekar (n 2). 
53
 [2009] EWHC 1765 [51]. 
 12 
Directive 2000/31/EC (better known as the Electronic Commerce [EC] Directive).
54
 
He found that none of the countries he considered, including France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland, have held Google to be liable for defamation 
as a result of it search engine results,
55
 with some (Portugal, Hungary and Romania) 
ruling that Google is only a ‘host’.56 In the end, Justice Eady fixed no responsibility 
on Google, and did not consider it to be a publisher either before or after notification 
of the defamatory statement in question.
57
 Google was not held liable for the 
publication of search results, as there was a lack of knowing involvement in 
publication and the company had no control over those results. With the benefit of 
hindsight (which will be explained further in the following section), we now know 
that the extent of Google’s control is much more extensive than Justice Eady 
envisioned it. If this newfound awareness of the technical ability of the Google search 
engine had been factored in, different legal reasoning may have been applied and a 
different legal conclusion reached. At the very least, it is unlikely that Google would 
have been considered a totally passive medium of communication.  
Nevertheless, Justice Eady’s practical approach in examining the role of an 
Internet intermediary and its relation to publication is laudable. His position in 
considering the state of knowledge of such an intermediary at the forefront of any 
debate on publication and defamation was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Tamiz 
v Google in 2012.
58
 The English courts need no longer worry about the common law 
                                                        
54
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, particularly electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] 
OJ L178/1(Directive on electronic commerce). The Directive has been transposed into English law by 
the Electronic Commerce (the EC Directive) Regulations 2002. 
55
 [2009] EWHC 1765 [98][106][107][109]. 
56
 ibid [100-104] 
57
 ibid [123]. 
58
 [2013] EWCA Civ 68 CA. Google Inc. was sued as an operator of the service of a blogger site in 
relation of anonymous defamatory comments by others. The Court of Appeal found that Google Inc. 
had only facilitated the publication of blog posts, which could not be construed as it being a publisher. 
 13 
conundrum on the vexing issue of publication for an Internet intermediary following 
England’s legislative reform in 2013.59  Unfortunately, the Hong Kong courts and 
those of other common law jurisdictions, which have been provided with no 
legislative guidelines in this respect, continue to grapple with this unresolved legal 
issue. 
Adhering to the orthodox common law view of a strict publication rule, the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal parted with the English approach in Fevaworks. It 
thus follows that Justice Ng of the Hong Kong High Court was bound in Yeung v 
Google by local precedent. In addition to relying on Hong Kong authority, 
importantly, Justice Ng also relied on the Australian authority of Trkulja v Google Inc. 
(No. 5) (hereinafter referred to as Trkulja),
60
 in which Justice David Beach of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria held that there was sufficient evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury, if properly directed, could return a verdict for the plaintiff and hold 
Google to be liable for defamation for its search results under orthodox common law 
principles. In Trkulja, the plaintiff was a music promoter who sued Google Inc. for 
search engine results that had turned up images and an article concerning his 
involvement with serious crime in Melbourne and alleging that rivals had hired a hit 
man to murder him. The jury’s verdict was that Google Inc. was a publisher of the 
defamatory material but was entitled to the defence of innocent dissemination for the 
period prior to receiving notification from the plaintiff. The company contended that 




                                                                                                                                                              
Different from Justice Eady, the higher court considered that Google’s position would be different once 
it had received a notice of complaint by the plaintiff, which would render it the publisher.   
59
 Section 5 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), see discussion  Mullis and Parkes (n 22) para. 6.39 and 6.40. 
60
 [2012] VSC 533, discussed in Yeung v Google (n 14)[97-102]. 
61
 [2012] VSC 533 [15]. 
 14 
Justice Beach did not accept Google Inc.’s argument, and further declared that 
Metropolitan Schools Ltd and Tamiz v Google Inc do not represent the common law 
in Australia.
62
 He ruled that Google Inc. could be held liable as a publisher because it 
operates an Internet search engine, an automated system, precisely as intended and 
has the ability to block identified web pages.
63
 For this judge, a search engine is like a 
newsagent or a library, which might not have the specific intention to publish but does 
have the relevant intention for the purpose of the law of defamation.
64
  
Convincing as that reasoning may have been to Justice Ng of the Hong Kong 
court, she did not have the benefit of the more recent decision in Bleyer v Google Inc 
(hereinafter referred to as Bleyer) delivered by the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales in Australia.
65
 In Bleyer, the plaintiff sued Google Inc. for its search engine 
results turning up seven items defamatory of him and delivering them to three people. 
Google Inc. sought an order to permanently stay or summarily dismiss the 
proceedings as an abuse of process.
66
 In addition to the issue of disproportionality 
between the cost of bringing an action and the interest at stake, Justice Lucy 
McCallum had to determine the applicable law on defamation for search engines. 
After reviewing the English authorities in Metropolitan Schools Ltd and Tamiz v 
Google, and the Australian in Trkulja, Justice McCallum decided to follow the former 
and to distinguish the case before her from Trkulja.
67
 She ruled that there was no 
human input in the application of Google’s search engine apart from the creation of 
the algorithm, and thus that Google could not be held liable as a publisher for results 
                                                        
62
 ibid [29]. 
63
 ibid [27]. 
64
 ibid [18-19]. 
65
 [2014] NSWSC 897. 
66
 ibid [2]. 
67
 ibid [66][72][76]. 
 15 
that appeared prior to notification of a complaint.
68
 Like Justice Eady, she relied on 
the landmark authority of Emmens v Pottle (the first challenge to the role of a 
newsvendor in defamation cases) and reiterated that ‘for a person to be held 
responsible there must be knowing involvement in the process of publication of the 
relevant words. It is not enough that a person merely plays a passive instrumental role 
in the process.’69 Further, she expressed reservations about viewing Google Inc. as 
playing the role of secondary publisher, facilitating publication in a manner analogous 
to a distributor.
70
 In Justice McCallum’s view, an Internet intermediary does no more 
than fulfil the role of a passive medium of communication and should not be 
characterised as a publisher.
71
 She distinguished the decision in Trkulja from hers in 
Bleyer on the grounds that the former was based on Urbanchich v Drummoyne 
Municipal Council,
72
 which concerned the liability of the Urban Transit Authority in 
failing to remove defamatory posters placed on its bus shelters after receiving notice 
of the plaintiff’s complaint. As a result, Justice McCallum concluded that it was clear 




Regardless of whether one agrees with Justice Eady’s or Justice McCallum’s 
analysis and conclusions, both have applied common sense and fairness to examining 
the role of an Internet intermediary and its automated search engine system in the 
context of the debate over publication and defamation. As one critic comments, ‘not 
every act of dissemination can or should lead to liability for publishing defamatory 
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matter’.74 The fundamental concept of publication in the Internet era must be carefully 
explored. 
 
Autocomplete and Related Searches 
Returning to our analysis of Yeung v Google, all of the cases discussed thus far 
concern the liability of a search engine but do not directly address Google’s 
Autocomplete and Related Searches functions. Interestingly, and significantly, when 
Justice Ng focused on these particular functions, she characterised the question as one 
of ‘whether they [search engines] are an information provider with a neutral tool or 
whether they act beyond the scope of simply making information publicly 
available’.75 In her view, the ‘more fundamental question’ is: ‘as a matter of general 
tort principle, should or should not a person/entity remain responsible in law for acts 
done by his/her tool, and what are the limits of such liability (if any)?’76 The focus in 
this part of her judgment switches from Google Inc.’s mere participation in 
publication to its instrumentality in the publication of the suggestions or predictions 
on its website.  
The defence counsel argued that Google Autocomplete should be seen as a 
neutral tool because Google Inc. has adopted an algorithm that requires no human 
input, and is thus a mere passive facilitator.
77
 He explained that the predictions or 
suggestions are drawn from the universe of previous users’ searches, 78  with 
Autocomplete turning up the most relevant or most frequently searched results. 
Google Inc. could not police or manually interfere with the huge volume of webpages 
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it crawls, has no control over the search terms entered by users and is unaware of 
predictions or search results at the time each search is conducted.
79
 In addition, he 
further argued that the predictions or suggestions generated in the case in question did 
not reflect the ultimate content of the search results, which might confirm or dispel 
rumours of the plaintiff’s triad connections.80 
Rather than seeing Google Autocomplete as playing a passive role, however, 
Justice Ng considered that Google Inc. ‘recombines’ and ‘aggregates’ data from web 
content, ‘reconstitutes’ aggregations based on what other users have at one time typed 
and then ‘transforms’ that data into suggestions and predictions.81 She cast serious 
doubt on the claim that Google Autocomplete is a neutral tool, given that its 
algorithms are ‘synthesising and reconstituting input query data by previous users and 
web content uploaded by internet users before publishing them’. Furthermore, she 
highlighted a number of Google Inc. practices, such as launching 516 improvements 
to its searches in a single year, censoring materials, manually editing results to 
improve the user experience, removing pages from its index for security reasons, 
interfering with search results for legal reasons (e.g. removing child sexual abuse 
content or cases of copyright infringement) and deleting spam.
82
  
At this juncture, one might have thought that Justice Ng was referring to the 
extent of control that Google Inc. has and could have exercised in the case in question. 
However, immediately after outlining this active role of Google Inc., her analysis 
turned to a discussion of the company’s knowledge, the other essential element in the 
defamation debate concerning whether a defendant is a primary or secondary 
publisher. In rebutting the defence counsel’s argument that, because of automation, 
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Google Inc. could not be said to be aware of the predictions or search results 
generated by its own design, Justice Ng reiterated that  
under the strict publication rule, the requisite mental element is not knowledge 
of the defamatory content or any intent to defame, but rather whether the 
defendant has actively facilitated or intentionally assisted in the process of 
conveying the material bearing the defamatory meaning to a third party, 
regardless of whether he knew that the material in question is defamatory.
83
 
With the control exercised by Google Inc. obvious, and the required mental element 
also present, the only logical conclusion in this case was that there was ‘plainly a 
good arguable case’ against Google Inc. and that Google Inc. was not a mere passive 
facilitator.
84
 Yet, Justice Ng stopped short of pursuing any further analysis of whether 
the company should be seen as a primary or secondary publisher. 
Whilst Justice Ng was perfectly justified in putting the legal discussion on 
hold, as her task was simply to decide whether a good arguable case could be 
established, any further analysis of liability for Google Autocomplete results based on 
whether Google Inc. is a primary or secondary publisher is likely to stretch common 
law analysis. On the one hand, Autocomplete passes on information, including (or 
despite the presence of) defamatory statements, exactly as intended by Google Inc.’s 
computer engineers and algorithm designers. The argument that the company lacks 
knowing involvement in publication and has no control over the result of searches is 
no longer persuasive. Arguably, Google Inc. and its Autocomplete function are more 
like a primary (than secondary) publisher, for which the defence of innocent 
dissemination is of no avail. However, the legal consequences of such a ruling would 
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simply be too drastic, as it would mean that Google Inc. would have to stop offering 
that function to avoid any further defamation lawsuits. 
On the other hand, to hold that Google Inc. is a secondary publisher would 
mean that the company plays only a subordinate role in disseminating defamatory 
statements, that it does not know or could not by the exercise of reasonable care be 
expected to know that publication of given content is likely to be defamatory and that 
it has no realistic ability of controlling such publication. In Yeung v Google, Justice 
Ng, who identified the requisite state of mind and degree of control that Google Inc. 
has with regard to Autocomplete, clearly felt some sympathy for the company, hinting 
that it could invoke the defence of innocent dissemination when the defence counsel 
raised the potential constitutional challenge to freedom of expression and chilling 
effect on its exercise.
85
 If Google Inc. is an innocent disseminator, then it can be held 
liable for a defamatory statement only after receiving notice. Reaching such a 
conclusion certainly absolves Google Inc. of extensive liability as a primary publisher, 
but it runs contrary to the company’s actual involvement in reality. Justice Ng’s ruling 
in this case risks being seen as an outcome-driven legal decision. 
In the context of Autocomplete, one has to admit that Google Inc.’s 
involvement is not extensive enough to render it akin to an author or editor. Yet, it 
clearly plays a more active role than that of a secondary publisher merely facilitating 
publication in a manner analogous to a library or post office. Unless the unique role of 
a search engine and its Autocomplete function is recognised in passing judgment in 
defamation cases such as this one, orthodox common law legal analysis will remain in 
limbo in this important area.  
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Autocomplete as Unique ‘Processor’: RS v Google  
The German Federal Court, in contrast, has recognised the specific role and 
contribution of Google Autocomplete in legal infringement, and engaged in a 
different type of legal analysis in the case of RS v Google. The legal dispute involved 
a businessman suing Google Inc. in Germany for displaying the terms ‘Scientology’ 
and ‘fraud’ (Betrug) in Google’s Autocomplete predictions whenever his (full) name 
was typed.
86
 The plaintiff was the founder and chairman of a stock corporation that 
sold food supplements and cosmetics on the Internet through a network marketing 
system. He sought an injunction to prohibit Google from suggesting the combination 
of such terms, arguing that doing so was an infringement of his personality rights 
(Persoenlichkeitsrecht)
87
 and harmed the reputation of his business. A preliminary 
injunction was initially granted, but Google Inc. refused to issue a final declaration. 
Whilst the Cologne Higher Regional Court ruled in Google’s favour and held that no 
conceptual or comprehensible meaning could be attached to the aforesaid 




The assessment of injunctive relief was examined by the Federal Court  under 
articles 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
89
 in conjunction with s. 
823(1) and s.1004 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)
90
 and article 7(1) of 
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the German Telemedia Act.
91
 It is a five step analysis looking into (1) the 
infringement of personality right; (2) the causal link between such infringement and 
the plaintiff’s right; (3) the unlawfulness of the infringing act; (4) the extent of 
Google Inc.’s liability; and (5) the nature of injunctive relief to be granted. 
As a first step, the Federal Court had to establish whether there was an 
infringement of personality rights. Under German Basic Law, article 1(1) protects 
one’s dignity, whilst article 2(1) protects the free development of one’s personality. 
The scope of personality rights is manifold, including protection against untrue 
assertions and the portrayal of any distorted picture of an individual in public.
92
 The 
plaintiff in RS v Google claimed that he had never been involved with Scientology 
and had never been accused of, or investigated for, any fraudulent activities. Rather 
than viewing the terms ‘Scientology’ and ‘fraud’ as devoid of any meaning, as the 
Cologne Court had done, the Federal Court considered that connecting the terms with 
the name of a real person could give rise to a meaningful association and negative 
connotation.
93
 The average reader would be likely to link the plaintiff with the sect 
and with the morally reprehensible action of taking advantage of another upon seeing 
the terms in combination.
94
 The Federal Court ruled that it would be only natural for 
Internet users to conclude that there was an objective link between the plaintiff and 
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the derogatory words upon viewing the Autocomplete results.
95
 As a result, the 
Federal Court concluded that the plaintiff’s rights of personality has been encroached. 
In the second step  the Federal Court also ruled that Google Inc. was directly 
responsible for infringing the plaintiff’s personality rights.96 It pointed out that it was 
Google Inc. that had analysed user behaviour using computer programmes it had 
developed and it was also Google Inc. that had made the corresponding suggestions to 
users.
97
 Those suggestions were not arbitrary results from an ‘ocean of data’ (direct 
quote from the Federal Court judgment).
98
 Further, the objectionable terms had been 
combined by the search engine, not by a third party.
99
 The Court pointed out that the 
search engine had been designed by Google Inc. in a specific manner, namely, in such 
a way that predictions developed search queries further through a search programme 
driven by highly complex algorithms. Hence, search queries previously typed could 
later present Internet users with a combination of the terms most frequently entered in 
relation to the search terms in question.
100
 Besides, the predictive terms had been 
made available on the Internet by Google Inc., and the Court thus ruled that they 
originated directly with Google Inc.
101
 Since Google Inc. has provided the predictions 
over the Internet by means of its search engine without involving any third party, the 
infringement can be directly attributed to Google Inc.. Yet, the Federal Court 
reminded us that in establishing infringement and causality do not yet permit drawing 
the conclusion that Goolge Inc. is liable ‘for each and every infringement of rights’ of 
personality through search engine predictions.  
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Consequently, the third step of analysis on the unlawfulness of an 
infringement requires balancing of conflicting rights and interests to be undertaken. 
Under German law, interference with rights of personality is only unlawful where the 
interests of the injured party take precedence over the interests of the defendants.
102
  
In examining the rights and intersts of Google Inc., the Federal Court stated 
that Google Inc. was a service provider in making its own information available for 
use, and thus came under the rubric of the Telemedia Act.
103
  The Court was also 
quick to point out that the plaintiff had not sued Google Inc. for being the conduit of 
or caching or storing third-party information, which, under s. 8-10 of the German 
Telemedia Act, the defendant would bear limited responsibility for. Instead, the 
plaintiff sued the company specifically for the search term predictions generated by 
its Autocomplete function, in other words for the search engine’s ‘own’ content 
(direct quote from the Court).
104
 Thus, Goolge Inc. could not claim exemption from 
responsibility for the contents of Autocomplete. 
Although the plaintiff’s rights to personality has been infringed by Google Inc,  
a comprehensive balancing of fundamental rights and conflicting interests needs to be 
undertaken under the framework of the Eureopan Court of Human Rights.
105
 The 
court weighed the rights of personality of the plaintiff (arts. (2) and 5(1) of the 
Constitution) against the defendant’s rights of personality, freedom of speech  and 
freedom to do business (arts. 2, 5(1) and 14 of the Constitution). In the Court’s 
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Based on this reasoning, it was ruled that Google had ‘somehow contributed 
towards’ causing ‘the unlawful impairment in an intentional and adequately causal 
manner’ and could be held as a co-liable party because it had the legal possibility of 
preventing the infringing act under s. 1004 of the Civil Code.
107
 Whether the 
defendant could be considered the offender or an accessory in the circumstances was 
irrelevant, particularly if it had the legal possibility of preventing the act.
108
 Liability 
here is strict in the sense that the defendant need not be aware of the circumstances 
giving rise to the offence and its unlawful nature, and fault is not required.
109
 
More significant to our present analysis is the fourth step of analysis on the 
extent of Goolge Inc.’s liability. Despite the fact that the Federal Court has ruled that 
Google Inc. is a co-liable party in respective of its fault, it also made it clear that 
Google Inc. is not ‘liablie unreservedly.110 The Federal Court highlighted the role of a 
search engine under the Telemedia Act, which bears close resemblance to the 
aforementioned EC Directive.
111
 The EC Directive defines the circumstances in which 





 or carried by them but which they did not create. In effect, it provides a 
‘safe haven’ allowing an exemption to ISPs’ liability when they are merely 
conduits,
114
 unless they have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information,
115
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but have failed to act expeditiously to remove the offending materials.
116
 Under the 
EC Direction framework, there is no general duty on ISPs to monitor information that 
passes through or is hosted on their system (article 15). The critical issue before the 
Federal Court in RS v Google was how to fit a search engine and its Autocomplete 
function into the existing framework. 
Accordingly, when the Federal Court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, it was 
considering Google Inc. to be a content provider in offering word combinations, 
predictions and suggestions through its Autocomplete function. The Court reasoned 
that Google Inc.’s activities were ‘not purely technical, automatic and passive in 
nature’117 nor ‘confined solely to the making available of information for access by 
third parties’.118 If Google Inc. was a content provider, then it would bear the highest 
standard of responsibility, including a duty to monitor content and remove or disable 
access to unlawful content (section 7 of the Telemedia Act).
119
 Following this 
reasoning, the only outcome would be that Google Inc. is no longer able to operate its 
Autocomplete function, as it would be effectively impossible for the company to 
carefully monitor the ‘ocean of data’ in cyberspace to prevent any defamatory 
predictions from appearing. 
Once again, one is caught in an odd legal limbo. Google’s Autocomplete is not 
a passive service provider of the search term predictions and combinations that it 
offers, and yet it is not the original author or source of defamatory material. It would 
be unfair to an injured party to view Google Inc. as a conduit or mere host of 
information, and yet it would be equally unfair to Google Inc. to hold it to the highest 
standard of responsibility as a content provider, which would render it impossible for 
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it to offer the Autocomplete function. To resolve this difficult dilemma, the German 
Federal Court opted for a practical approach. It highlighted the fact that Google Inc. 
Autocomplete ‘processes’ information in a unique way beyond the existing legal 
framework of the ‘technical process of operating and giving access to a 
communication network’120 and that the company’s interests and rights are protected 
by articles 2, 5(1) and 14 of the German Basic Law. Under the German Constitution, 
Google Inc. is also entitled to the right of the free development of its personality, to 
freedom of speech and to freedom to do business.
121
 
Due to the various possibilities for an infringement of the ‘personality right’, 
the court tried to limit liability to a certain extent and examined as a fifth step as to 
whether it was possible to prevent and reasonably expectable for the defendant to 
prevent the realization of the occurrence in question. The court thereby relied on the 
aspect “whether and to what extent the party sued can be expected to monitor in the 
relevant circumstance”, i.e. the duty to monitor. Thereby the Court distinguished that 
the search engine operator is under obligation to monitor prediction in advance for 
any infractions, but it has to apply a preventive filter for certain areas. Besides, it 
affirmed a duty to monitor only in case when it becomes aware of the infringement of 
rights. 
Despite the fact that Google had contributed to the infringement of the 
plaintiff’s personality rights in RS v Google, the Federal Court gave weight to the 
Autocomplete feature being not reprehensible but rather a legitimate business 
activity.
122
 The Court further noted that a search engine does not aim from the outset 
to infringe any rights to assert untrue allegations against any person.
123
 More 
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specifically, the Court took into account that it was only through the additional 
element of certain third-party behaviour that derogatory combinations of terms could 
be generated by the system.
124
 Nevertheless, it highlighted Google Autocomplete’s 
role as a processer of users’ search queries using its own programme to form word 
combinations
125
: ‘[O]wing to the processing it conducts, the defendant is responsible 
for the terms proposed in the form of predictions.’ 126  Consequently, the Court 
concluded that Google Inc. could be held liable only for failing to take sufficient 
precautions to prevent the predictions generated by its algorithm from infringing the 
rights of the plaintiff.
127
 Given that Google Inc. has the power and control to remove 
and to interfere with word combinations and predictions, it has the obligation to 
monitor and prevent such infringements in future after it has received notice from a 
complainant.
128
 In sum, the Court formulated the rule of notice and takedown for a 
special type of ‘processor’. The case itself was sent back to the Cologne Higher 









In juxtaposing the Hong Kong Court’s decision in Yeung v Google and the 
German Federal Court’s judgment in RS v Google, one realises that the legal 
challenge posed by Autocomplete lies in its ambivalent nature. Not only does this 
relatively new algorithm fail to fit with our understanding of what a publisher and 
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innocent disseminator are under orthodox common law dating back to the 19
th
 century, 
but it also sits uncomfortably with contemporary categories of ISPs, that is, passive 
host provider, mere conduit or content provider, formulated under the European EC 
model in the 21
st
 century. Whilst the German Court made a bold move in recognising 
Autocomplete as a unique type of processor and imposing upon it a new set of 
obligations to monitor, block and prevent predictions with defamatory content upon 
notice of complaint, the Hong Kong Court is faltering along the path of defamation  
liability under orthodox common law concepts. 
In a related debate on the role and liabilities of a search engine in different 
contexts (defamation, unfair competition and free speech) in the US, academics have 
urged us to acknowledge the special functions of a search engine and its various 
features. For instance, James Grimmelmann labels a search engine an ‘advisor’,130 
and Seema Ghatnekar calls Autocomplete a ‘algorithm based re-publisher’.131 We 
have all experienced the efficiency of Autocomplete, and in this chapter witnessed 
how its roles as advisor and re-publisher have been prominently played out in the 
present legal debate. Google Inc. has indisputably tampered with information 
transmission in exercising algorithm-based editorial control to actively generate 
suggestions for users. It has combined not only human input and artificial intelligence, 
but also the third-party content of search terms from numerous Internet users and its 
own sophisticated algorithm editing. It certainly has the power to exercise control and 
curtail results. Perhaps, Autocomplete should be seen as an ‘AI processor’. Whatever 
it is called, until judges or legislators are willing to acknowledge this new ‘in-between’ 
creature that can combine the transmission of bits of information with the selection 
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and transformation of content production, there remains a long way to go to reach the 
ultimate goal and sensible solution of a notice-and-takedown liability regime.   
 
